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ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of offshoring has sparked a contentious debate over its impact on the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, which has recorded steep employment declines yet strong output growth—a fact 
reconciled by the notable gains in manufacturing productivity. We maintain, however, that the dramatic 
acceleration of imports from developing countries has imparted a significant bias to the official statistics. 
In particular, the price declines associated with the shift to low-cost foreign suppliers generally are not 
captured in input cost and import price indexes. To assess the implications of offshoring bias for 
manufacturing productivity and value added, we implement the bias correction developed by Diewert and 
Nakamura (2009) to the input price index in a growth accounting framework, using a variety of 
assumptions about the magnitude of the discounts from offshoring. We find that from 1997 to 2007 
average annual multifactor productivity growth in manufacturing was overstated by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage 
point and real value added growth by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage point. Furthermore, although the bias from 
offshoring represents a relatively small share of real value added growth in the computer and electronic 
products industry, it may have accounted for a fifth to a half of the growth in real value added in the rest 
of manufacturing. 
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1Offshoring and the State of American Manufacturing 
Developing economies have become the new, low-cost suppliers of a wide range of products 
purchased by consumers and used as intermediate inputs by producers, with China—now the largest 
exporter to the United States—accounting for about a third of the growth in commodity imports over the 
last decade. The rapid growth of offshoring—defined as the substitution of imported for domestically 
produced goods and services—contributed to a ballooning trade deficit and sparked a contentious debate 
over its impact on the U.S. manufacturing sector, which shed 20 percent of its employment, or roughly 
3.5 million jobs, from 1997 to 2007. Concerns over employment losses and the trade deficit have 
prompted a recent spate of government and private sector proposals to revitalize manufacturing.1
Our paper highlights the dramatic growth of offshoring and the structural changes occurring in 
manufacturing in the decade prior to the current recession. During this time, more than 40 percent of 
imported manufactured goods were used as intermediate inputs, primarily by domestic manufacturers. 
Using a growth accounting framework, we examine the contributions to the growth in real (constant 
price) domestic shipments in manufacturing from the inputs to production and from multifactor 
productivity (MFP). A novel feature of our analysis is that we distinguish between imported and domestic 
materials inputs, which enables us to more closely examine offshoring by manufacturers. We find 
substantial evidence of offshoring. The contribution from imported materials to the growth in real 
manufacturing shipments was larger than that of any other factor input and was more than twice the 
contribution from capital. At the same time, contributions from domestic materials and, reflecting 
declining employment, labor were negative.  
In spite of the steep employment declines in manufacturing, official statistics indicate that real 
value-added growth in U.S. manufacturing was robust, increasing almost as quickly as that for all 
nonfarm business. What happened in manufacturing? As put by former Labor Secretary Robert Reich 
(2009), “In two words, productivity growth.” Indeed, the disparate trends in manufacturing—steep 
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1 See, for example, Executive Office of the President (2009), Helper (2008), New America Foundation 
(2010), Pisano and Shih (2009), Pollin and Baker (2010), and Surdna Foundation (2010).   
2employment declines and strong output growth—are reconciled in the data by high productivity growth. 
While Reich and others have cited the strong output and productivity figures as evidence of the strength 
of the American manufacturing, we discuss reasons to qualify this conclusion. 
First, the robust output and productivity growth in manufacturing is largely attributable to one 
industry: computer and electronic products manufacturing. The average annual growth rate of value added 
in manufacturing excluding computers—which accounted for about 90 percent of manufacturing value 
added throughout the period—was less than a third of the published growth rate for all manufacturing. As 
a result, the aggregate numbers do not accurately characterize trends in most of manufacturing.  
Second, the price declines associated with the shift to low-cost foreign suppliers generally are not 
captured in price indexes. The problem is analogous to the widely discussed problem of outlet 
substitution bias in the literature on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Just as the CPI fails to capture lower 
prices for consumers due to the entry and expansion of big-box retailers like Wal-Mart, import price 
indexes and the intermediate input price indexes based on them do not capture the price drops associated 
with a shift to new low-cost suppliers in China and other developing countries. A bias to the input price 
index from offshoring implies that the real growth of imported inputs has been understated. And if input 
growth is understated, it follows that the growth in MFP and real value added have been overstated.  
Building upon Diewert’s (1998) characterization of the bias from outlet substitution to the CPI, 
Diewert and Nakamura (2010) demonstrate that the bias to the input price index is proportional to the 
growth in share captured by the low-cost supplier and the percentage discount offered by the low-cost 
supplier. Although the actual input price changes from offshoring are not systematically observed, 
evidence from import price microdata from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), industry case studies, 
and the business press indicate that there are sizable discounts from offshoring to low-wage countries.  
If this evidence is representative of the actual discounts manufacturers realized from offshoring, 
then the biases to MFP and value-added growth may well be significant. We estimate that average annual 
MFP growth in manufacturing was overstated by 0.1–0.2 percentage points and real value-added growth 
by 0.2–0.5 percentage points from 1997 to 2007. And, although the bias from offshoring represents a 
3relatively small share of real value-added growth in the computer industry, it may have accounted for 
one-fifth to one-half of the growth in real value added in the rest of manufacturing. Moreover, our work 
only examines biases to manufacturing statistics from the offshoring of material inputs. Additional biases 
may have arisen from the substitution of imported for domestically produced capital equipment and from 
the offshoring of services.
These biases have implications not only for the industry statistics, but also for the analyses based 
on them. Because the growth of these imports will be understated in real terms, offshoring will, at least to 
some degree, manifest itself as mismeasured productivity gains. As a result, studies that endeavor to 
assess the impact of low-cost imports on the American economy and its workers may well understate the 
true effects.  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE STATE OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING  
One of the most important developments in the U.S. economy in recent years has been the rapid 
growth of trade. After being little changed in the early 1990s, the total value of imports and exports of 
goods and services jumped from roughly 20 percent of U.S. GDP to 28 percent prior to the recent 
downturn. About 80 percent of the increase was attributable to a run up in the value of imports. The 
growth of nonoil imports was the most important contributor to the increase in imports during this period, 
and nonoil goods imports—largely manufactured goods—accounted for almost half of total import 
growth, while oil accounted for about a third and services for the remainder.2
The surge in the imports of manufactured goods—more than 100 percent from 1997 to 2007—
reflects both an increase in the import share of goods for final consumption as well as the import share of 
intermediate inputs. According to the BEA, the import share of intermediate material inputs used by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 BEA data on the trade in services in 2008 indicate that 59 percent was travel, transport, royalties, and 
education related, while the remaining 41 percent was business services. 
4manufacturers increased from under 17 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2007. 3 Figure 1 plots this 
substantial shift in the sourcing of intermediates from domestic to foreign suppliers.  
Also in Figure 1 the imported intermediate materials are classified by type of source country—
developing, intermediate, and advanced. We classify countries with less than 20 percent of U.S. per capita 
GDP in 2008 as developing, and with a few exceptions, countries with per capita GDP equal to or 
exceeding two-thirds that of that in the United States as advanced. The remaining countries are classified 
as intermediate. 4 Developing countries accounted for half of the growth in foreign materials inputs, with 
much of that growth coming from China. Intermediate countries, such as Mexico, accounted for about a 
third of the growth. 
How has the manufacturing sector performed given the growth of imports from low-wage 
countries? In particular, has the substantial shift in sourcing “hollowed out” manufacturing or instead 
contributed to the emergence of a leaner, more efficient industrial sector? On the one hand, dramatic 
drops in employment are often taken to portray a sector in decline. The precipitous decline in 
manufacturing employment since the late 1990s is evident in Figure 2 and is coincident with the rise in 
foreign sourcing. Employment never rebounded after the 2001–2002 recession as it had following 
previous downturns. Indeed, in the decade leading up to the current recession, manufacturing employment 
declined by 20 percent, while manufacturing’s share of employment in the economy fell from 14 percent 
in 1997 to 10 percent in 2007 (Figure 3). Reflecting plant closures that accompanied the employment 
declines, the net number of manufacturing establishments fell by 10 percent from 1998 to 2007. At the 
same time, the nominal share of manufacturing value added in GDP fell from 15.4 percent in 1997 to 11.7 
percent in 2007. 
Statistics on manufacturing production, however, paint a much more favorable picture of the 
sector. From 1960 to 2009, the average annual rate of change in real nonfarm business output was 3.5 
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3 Government surveys do not explicitly track the destination of imports to final and intermediate uses.  In 
the data we employ within this paper, the BEA assumes that an industry’s use of a specific import is in proportion to 
its overall use of that commodity in the economy, i.e., the import comparability or proportionality assumption. 
4 The main exceptions are Middle Eastern oil producers, which we classify as intermediate countries. 
5percent, only slightly higher than the 3.2 percent average annual change for manufacturing.5 More 
recently, from 1997 to 2007, the average annual growth rate of real manufacturing production was 3 
percent, almost the same as the 3.1 percent growth for all private industry.6 Moreover, cross-country 
comparisons show larger production gains in U.S. manufacturing relative to other advanced industrial 
countries, according to OECD data.
The divergent trends of employment declines and plant closures, on the one hand, and rapid 
growth in real value added, on the other, are primarily reconciled through the lens of productivity. The 
steadily increasing series displayed in Figure 3 shows the ratio of output per hour in manufacturing to 
output per hour in all nonfarm business since 1960; the series indicates that labor productivity grew 
considerably faster in manufacturing throughout the period. Indeed, the average annual growth rate of 
labor productivity in manufacturing during 1997 to 2007 was 4.1 percent compared to 2.7 percent for all 
nonfarm business. Manufacturing labor productivity also grew substantially faster in the United States 
than in most other major industrialized countries during that decade (see BLS 2009). The rapid growth in 
labor productivity has more than offset the declines in labor input and has permitted firms to sustain 
robust growth in real value added.  
Analysts have pointed to the robust output and productivity growth to argue that the 
manufacturing sector is relatively healthy.7 Our work, however, suggests the story is more complex. The 
aggregate numbers are unrepresentative of the trends in most of manufacturing. Moreover, we find that 
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5  Although the average growth of manufacturing has been fairly close to that of the economy as a whole, 
the sector has typically exhibited greater cyclical swings.  As a result, the sector tends to make outsized 
contributions to changes in GDP growth during economic turning points (Corrado and Mattey 1997). In addition, the 
relatively faster gains in manufacturing productivity have resulted in lower relative goods prices, which, in 
combination with inelastic demand for goods (on average), has led to a decline in manufacturing’s share of nominal 
output.  
6  With the BEA’s May 2010 comprehensive revision to the annual industry accounts, manufacturing 
output now expands at a slightly faster rate during this period.  The analysis throughout this paper is based upon the 
previous vintage of these data published in 2009. 
7 This perspective is illustrated by Executive Office of the President (2009), which emphasizes the strength 
of output and productivity and growth of U.S. manufacturers vis-à-vis the aggregate economy and manufacturers in 
other industrialized countries and which largely attributes employment declines to productivity growth. Recent 
articles in the popular press also have advanced this view (e.g., Economist 2005; Murray 2009).  
6the performance of U.S. manufacturing has been overstated to some extent in the official statistics 
because of offshoring.  
EVIDENCE OF OFFSHORING BY MANUFACTURERS
We begin our analysis by examining the sources of the growth in manufacturing. Toward this 
end, we utilize a standard growth accounting framework in which output is defined as manufacturing 
shipments adjusted for price changes—termed real gross output. We decompose growth into the parts 
resulting from the growth of inputs to production—capital, labor, services, energy, and materials inputs—
and MFP growth, which is computed as a residual. In other words, MFP growth is the part of output  
growth that cannot be accounted for by the growth of factor inputs, and therefore represents the returns to 
all factors of production.8
As mentioned, a novel feature of our analysis is that we distinguish between domestically sourced 
and foreign materials inputs. Specifically, we use unpublished BEA data on the value of imports and 
imported input prices at a detailed commodity level to distinguish between the growth of domestic and 
imported materials inputs. 
Using these data, we compute MFP growth for manufacturing as the growth in real gross output 
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8 See Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) and Hulten (2009) for more on the growth accounting 
methodology, its early development, and current applications. The industry-level data for output, materials, energy, 
and services come from the BEA’s GDP-by-industry accounts. Capital services inputs for are derived from the 
BEA’s fixed asset accounts. The labor input is based on industry-level hours worked from the national income and 
product accounts, adjusted for changes in the worker composition effects using wage data from the Census Bureau’s 
county business patterns. 
7The weights (w) on each input represent the input’s share of total input costs. Any error in the 
measurement of input growth—including errors that result from biased price indexes used to deflate the 
inputs—will directly result in an error in the measurement of productivity growth. 
Equation (1) can be rearranged to obtain an identity in which output growth is decomposed into 
MFP growth and contributions from the growth of factor inputs. Table 1 provides the results of this 
decomposition for manufacturing and selected industry breakouts from 1997 to 2007. Note that the 
figures in column (1), which represent the average annual real output growth rate over the period, equal 
the sum of the figures in columns (2) through (8), which represent the contributions to output growth 
from MFP and from the growth of the indicated inputs.  
Several striking findings emerge from this table. One is the strong MFP growth. The contribution 
to real output growth from MFP actually exceeds real gross output growth, indicating that MFP can 
account for all of the growth in real gross output over the decade. Capital, purchased services, and 
materials all play important, albeit more modest, roles, while the contribution of labor is negative and 
large, reflecting the steep employment declines during the period.9
Columns (7) and (8) in Table 1 provide a clear picture of the rapid pace of structural change 
currently under way in U.S. manufacturing. During the period, the contribution of domestically supplied 
materials inputs fell, while that of imported materials inputs greatly expanded, reflecting the substitution 
of foreign for domestic intermediate inputs. The growth of imported intermediate inputs, to some degree, 
will also reflect the direct substitution of imported goods for domestic labor and capital. To see this, 
consider the case in which a firm previously produced an intermediate input and final product internally, 
but now sources that input from a foreign supplier. In this instance, gross output will not change, but 
imported materials inputs will rise and the labor and capital previously used to produce the input will fall.  
For all manufacturing, the contribution of imported materials inputs to output growth was greater 
than that of any other factor of production and was more than double the contribution from capital. For 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The growth accounting results in Table 1 reflect the authors’ calculations and rely on a different 
methodology than what is used by the BLS. However, these two salient features of the data are also observed in the 
BLS estimates. A full reconciliation of the two approaches appears in Houseman et al. (2010). 
8manufacturing excluding the computer industry, imported materials account for 60 percent of the growth 
during this period.  
Another striking result in Table 1 is that computer and electronic products manufacturing—which 
includes computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment—accounts for most of the 
output and productivity growth in manufacturing over the period.10 Output and productivity growth in the 
computer industry averaged 7.4 and 6.8 percent per year, respectively, compared to growth of only about 
0.5 percent for output and 0.7 percent for MFP in the rest of manufacturing. The extraordinary 
productivity and output growth in computers reflects, to a large degree, technological improvements of 
the products produced and output price deflators that, when properly adjusted for product improvements, 
are often falling rapidly.11
Throughout the decade, the computer industry’s share of manufacturing value added remained 
relatively constant at around 10 percent. Because manufacturing output and productivity statistics are 
strongly affected by the computer industry, which represents such a small share of the sector, researchers 
should be cautious in drawing general inferences about manufacturing from the aggregate numbers. It 
also bears note that statistics on industry output and productivity growth should be interpreted in relation 
to growth in demand for the industry’s products. Indeed, in spite of rapid value added and productivity 
growth of computers and electronic products manufacturing during the decade, the trade deficit within 
this product group greatly widened and substantial offshoring of components of the industry occurred 
(Brown and Linden 2005; Linden, Dedrick, and Kraemer 2009). 
Because statistics on labor productivity, defined as output per hour worked, are widely used in 
research and policy analyses, it is also of interest to consider the relationship between labor productivity 
growth and offshoring. In the official BLS labor productivity release, manufacturing output includes 
imported intermediates but excludes intermediates sourced from within the domestic manufacturing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Similar findings have been reported in other studies. See, for example, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) 
and Oliner and Sichel (2000). See also Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007) and Syverson (2010) for more in-depth 
reviews of recent research on U.S. productivity. 
11 The BLS uses hedonic methods to adjust prices in the computer industry. For a review of these, see 
Wasshausen and Moulton (2006). 
9sector. As a result, shifts in sourcing from a domestic to a foreign supplier do not offset each other, 
mechanically increasing labor productivity.12 To this point, Eldridge and Harper (2009) find that imported 
intermediate materials explain 20 percent of the growth in manufacturing labor productivity from 1997 to 
2006. We find that the contribution to manufacturing labor productivity from imported materials inputs 
significantly accelerated over the period.  
Although Table 1 documents the substantial growth in offshoring during the period, it 
nevertheless likely understates the true magnitude of the phenomenon. Our focus below concerns the 
systematic upward bias in the price indexes used to deflate intermediate materials. We could not account 
for the measurement of two additional factors, which likely also impart an upward bias: 1) imported 
capital inputs, such as computers and machinery, have exhibited substantial gains in import penetration; 
and 2) imported services inputs (i.e., services offshoring) have accelerated in recent years, albeit from a 
very low level. 13
BIAS TO PRICE INDEXES FROM OFFSHORING 
Understanding why offshoring likely results in biases to the price indexes used to deflate inputs 
requires some background on the relevant price programs. In addition to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
the BLS constructs separate price indexes for imports, exports, and domestically produced goods. Just as 
the BLS constructs the CPI to measure the rate of price change of goods and services purchased by 
consumers, the BEA constructs input price indexes to measure the rate of price change of inputs to 
production purchased by businesses. The BEA constructs industry-specific input price indexes using 
import and domestic price indexes in conjunction with information on each industry’s input structure 
from the input-output tables. The import price data come from the BLS’s International Price Program 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This could also occur if a firm imports an intermediate input it previously produced internally. In this 
case, output will not change, but the labor input used to produce that intermediate input will fall.  
13 See Cavallo and Landry (2010) for a discussion of imported capital goods, and Eldridge and Harper 
(2009) and Yuskavage, Strassner, and Maderios (2008) and for estimates of services offshoring. 
10 
(IPP), which surveys importing establishments on the prices paid for imports of a detailed product. For 
domestic materials prices, the BEA primarily uses the Producer Prices Index (PPI) in which BLS surveys 
domestic producers on the prices they receive for a sample of products.14
The BLS takes great care to ensure that it is pricing the same item over time, and thus that price 
indexes are based on “apples-to-apples” comparisons. Each observation used in the construction of a 
particular price index represents the period-to-period price change of an item as defined by very specific 
attributes and reported by a specific establishment. These methods mean, however, that price indexes 
neither capture the price changes associated with the entry of a low-cost supplier nor the level differences 
in prices which drive its subsequent market share expansion. As mentioned, this problem has been studied 
extensively in the CPI literature, where it has been dubbed “outlet substitution bias” (Diewert 1998, 
Hausman 2003, and Reinsdorf 1993).  
Figure 4 presents a stylized depiction of the problem in the context of offshoring. The BLS 
measures the price change from period t to t+1 of a specific imported product at a specific importer in the 
IPP, and it measures the price change from period t to t+1 of a specific product produced by a specific 
domestic producer in the PPI. Neither the IPP nor the PPI captures the price drop (d) that occurs when 
businesses shift from a high-cost domestic to a low-cost foreign supplier. The input price index is, in 
essence, a weighted average of period-to-period changes measured in the IPP and the PPI, and thus the 
price drop from offshoring is missed.15
To further illustrate how offshoring can impart a bias into the input price index, Table 2 provides 
a hypothetical numerical example. Suppose that pharmaceutical companies purchase a common chemical 
compound, “obtanium,” from a domestic supplier at $10 per ounce. A Chinese supplier enters the market 
and sells obtanium for $6 per ounce. As the new, lower-cost source becomes known, its reliability is 
established, and contracts with the domestic supplier expire, U.S. pharmaceutical companies begin 
shifting their purchases to the Chinese supplier. For simplicity, we assume that the domestic and foreign 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 For more information on the BLS price index computations, see Chapters 14 and 15 in BLS (2009). 
15 Although our empirical focus is on the substitution of imported for domestic inputs, a bias would also 
occur with the entry and market share expansion of a new low-cost domestic supplier.  
11 
dollar prices of obtanium remain the same throughout the period.16 Even if the BLS picks up the Chinese 
import of obtanium in its import prices sample without a lag, it will not capture the input price drop 
enjoyed by drug manufacturers at the time of the switch.  
The input price index, as computed by the statistical agencies, is a weighted average of the 
domestic and import index, and, in our example, does not change. The correct index, however, would 
capture the period-to-period change of the average price that U.S. companies pay for obtanium and falls 
by 12 percent. More rapid introduction of new suppliers into the BLS sampling frame or more frequent 
sampling of prices—common suggestions for improving price statistics—will not address this particular 
problem.  
The bias to the price index arises because neither the U.S. producer nor the U.S. importer can 
report the price drop that buyers experience when they shift their purchases from domestic to foreign 
suppliers. To address this problem, the BLS has proposed that an input index be constructed based on a 
survey of purchasers (Alterman 2009).17 In theory, the buyers could accurately report the period-to-period 
changes in the price they pay for specific inputs, irrespective of source.
Diewert and Nakamura (2010) characterize the bias to the input price index resulting from a shift 
in input suppliers. The upward bias (B) to the rate of inflation in the input price index (1+i) is 
proportional to the share captured by the low-cost supplier over the period (s) and the percentage 
difference in the prices of the low- versus the high-cost supplier—or discount—(d):
 (2)    (1 )B i sd$ &
Returning to our obtanium example, over the period there is no measured inflation (i.e., i equals zero), the 
low-cost supplier captures a 30 percent market share, and the discount from the low-cost supplier is 40 
percent. Whereas the measured rate of price change is zero, the true rate of price change for that input is -
0.12, or negative 12 percent. The characterization of the bias to the input price index in Equation (2) is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Because prices are often contractually set for periods of time, this simplifying assumption of price 
stickiness is not unrealistic. Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) document that 40 percent of prices on imported items 
never change for the entire duration they are in the BLS sample.   
17 The proposed input cost index is still at the concept and design stage at the BLS.  
12 
identical to the characterization of the bias to the CPI (Diewert 1998). It is the same problem manifested 
in a different index. 18
As shown in Figure 5, the problem is evident in the input price indexes used by the BEA to 
deflate intermediate materials inputs. If price indexes were accurately capturing the cost savings to 
businesses that presumably underlie the recent share growth of imported intermediates, then the growth of 
the import price index should be slower than the domestic price index, indicating a fall in the price of 
imported relative to domestic inputs. Instead, the foreign price deflator for intermediate materials rose 
faster than the domestic deflator. The differential between foreign and domestic materials price deflators 
is especially apparent beginning in 2002, coincident with the rapid rise of imports from China.
EVIDENCE OF COST SAVINGS FROM OFFSHORING 
No comprehensive evidence exists on the magnitude of the cost savings from shifts in sourcing—
i.e., the discount, d, in Equation (2). A few case studies, however, provide some evidence for selected 
products and industries. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2010) find sizable cross-country differences in the 
prices of semiconductor wafers with identical specifications. On average, they find that, compared to 
prices of semiconductor wafers produced in U.S. foundries, prices were on average about 40 percent 
lower in China and about 25 percent lower in Singapore. Klier and Rubenstein (2009) find that offshoring 
aluminum wheel production to Mexico lowered overall costs by 19 percent and processing costs by 36 
percent.
The different samples in the IPP and PPI do not permit a direct comparison of prices for domestic 
and imported items. However, such a comparison is possible among imported products originating in 
different countries. Products from intermediate and, especially, developing countries were gaining market 
share not only vis-à-vis the United States but also other advanced countries. On the grounds that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Although the goods in this model are treated as homogeneous, Diewert (1998) provides a simple 
extension to where the goods are different qualities. In this case, the discount represents the price differential 
adjusted for quality. 
13 
production cost structures are likely to be more similar between the United States and other advanced 
countries, systematic import price differentials between products from advanced versus developing and 
intermediate countries may be informative about the size of the discount relative to U.S. goods.  
Figure 6 shows the average percentage differences between imported products from advanced and 
developing countries and between advanced and intermediate countries as recorded in the BLS microdata 
underlying the IPP. The position of each bubble represents the size of the discount for a single North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 4-digit category in manufacturing. The size of each 
bubble is proportional to the gain in U.S. market share for developing and intermediate countries within 
each category. In almost all cases, the discounts are negative, indicating lower prices in developing and 
intermediate countries compared to advanced countries. In many cases, these discounts appear to be quite 
sizable. Further, the size of a discount is negatively correlated with a gain in market share, indicating that 
the larger the developing or intermediate country’s price differential, the greater the U.S. market share 
captured. Products on the left side of the figure (i.e., food, beverages, textiles, and apparel) are 
characterized by smaller discounts and share gains, whereas products to the right (i.e., machinery, 
electronics, semiconductors, and transportation) are characterized by larger discounts and share gains.  
An important caveat to this figure is that even within very detailed product codes there may be 
considerable heterogeneity that may explain at least some of the price differentials. Returning again to our 
example in the previous section, if obtanium is a differentiated product and the Chinese version is of a 
lower quality than that from Japan, then Chinese obtanium should trade at a discount relative to a variety 
that is not strictly comparable. We adopt various methods to control for possible heterogeneity. In 
particular, one method restricts the import price sample to cases in which there is a newly observed price 
for an incumbent importing firm within the same detailed product code. In this way, we are able to narrow 
the sample to instances in which an importer appears to be switching sources of a specific product from a 
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supplier in an advanced country to one in a developing or intermediate country. The observed price 
differentials are somewhat smaller but still sizable when we limit our sample in this way.19
The evidence from case studies and from comparisons of import prices is consistent with reports 
of large discounts in the business literature. For example, in 2004 Business Week reported that prices of 
imported goods from China typically were 30 to 50 percent lower than the prices for comparable products 
produced in the United States, and that the discounts were sometimes higher (Engardio and Roberts 
2004). Similarly, a McKinsey & Company (2006) study cited cost savings from production of electronic 
equipment in China of between 20 and 60 percent. Estimates of the savings from offshoring auto parts 
production to Mexico are generally in the range of 20 to 30 percent (see discussion in Kinsman 2004). In 
sum, although no systematic data exist, a variety of evidence points to large cost savings from offshoring.  
The above-mentioned price differentials could be the result of numerous factors, such as labor 
costs, industrial policy, or disequilibrium in exchange rate markets. For instance, the Manufacturers 
Alliance of the National Association of Manufactures provides estimates of manufacturing labor costs, 
adjusted for productivity, for major U.S. trading partners as compared to the United States. Their 
estimates of large labor cost savings—58–72 percent lower in China and 22–62 percent in Mexico from 
2002 to 2009—are consistent with the large product discounts reported in research and in the business 
press (Leonard 2008). Also consistent with the evidence of cost savings from offshoring are estimates that 
the Chinese renminbi may be significantly undervalued relative to the dollar, perhaps by as much as 40 
percent (Bergsten 2010, Cline and Williamson 2010).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Houseman et al. (2010) describe this approach in greater detail. We also attempt to account for 
unobserved differences in product characteristics using an econometric model informed by estimates of product-
level quality from Mandel (2010). We find that the price dispersion across source countries decreases but remains 
substantial. In short, it is unlikely that product differentiation accounts for the large, persistent price differences 
across countries. 
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BIAS TO PRODUCTIVITY AND VALUE ADDED FROM OFFSHORING 
We implement the bias correction to input prices in Equation (2) and simulate the effects of the 
bias on MFP and value-added growth. Figure 7 illustrates what the bias to industry-level materials 
deflators would be if the true import discounts match those derived from the full sample of import price 
microdata. The vertical distance between each point and the 45 degree line represents the size of the bias. 
For all manufacturing, if the true import discount can be approximated by the IPP microdata, then the 
cumulative price growth of 20 percent between 1997 and 2007 would overstate the bias-corrected 
inflation rate by a full 9 percentage points. Thus, once we account for offshoring bias, the materials costs 
faced by U.S. manufacturers would only have risen at half the rate reported in official estimates. This, in 
turn, would imply that the real use of materials by U.S. manufacturers was twice as large as reported. 
With more production being generated by purchased materials, both productivity and value added would 
be diminished. Also shown in Figure 7 are the implied industry-level cumulative price changes under this 
set of assumptions about import price discounts.  
By how much might the productivity statistics be overstated from failing to account for 
offshoring? The top panel of Table 3 presents alternative estimates of MFP growth based upon different 
assumptions about the import discount. Column (1) restates our baseline MFP results from Table 1, while 
column (2) presents estimates in which all commodities—both domestic and imported—have been 
deflated with domestic deflators provided to us by the BEA. Since our alternative materials deflators are 
derived by adjusting domestic commodity prices (primarily PPIs), the estimates in column (2) should be 
viewed as the appropriate reference or “jumping-off” point for gauging the extent of offshoring bias. In 
other words, they show what MFP would be if the rate of price inflation for imported commodities was 
the same as for their domestic counterparts. This assumption in Equation (2) is maintained in order to 
hone in on the impact of the level difference in prices between imported and domestic commodities. 
For the entire manufacturing sector, deflating imported materials with domestic prices reduces 
MFP growth by a bit less than 0.1 percentage point, from 1.30 percent in our baseline scenario to 1.23 
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percent. Almost all of this change owes to differences in the price deflators used for imported and 
domestic semiconductors. In other words, prices for imported semiconductors—a product used heavily by 
the computer and electronic products industry—fell less rapidly than their domestic counterparts. The 
discrepancies are especially evident in the early years of our data and appear to be the result of 
inconsistent adjustment of imported and domestic semiconductor prices for quality improvements. 
Although not the focus of our paper, the drop in MFP between columns (1) and (2) likely represents an 
additional modest bias.20
Columns (3) and (4) present MFP estimates that have been adjusted for offshoring using our 
micro evidence on the import discount. We report estimates using product-level discounts based on the 
entire microdata sample (“full sample”) and on a sample limited to instances where importers appear to 
shift from suppliers in advanced counties to ones in developing or intermediate countries (“switchers”). In 
columns (5) and (6), we estimate MFP using import discounts informed by the business press and 
available case study evidence, applying these discounts uniformly across commodities. The column 
labeled “50/30” assumes discounts of 50 percent for developing countries and 30 percent for intermediate 
countries, whereas the column labeled “30/15” assumes discounts of 30 percent for developing countries 
and 15 percent for intermediate countries. These represent discounts on the high and low end, 
respectively, of those found in the case study and business literature.  
On balance, for the entire manufacturing sector, we find that adjusting for offshoring lowers MFP 
growth by an additional 0.1–0.2 percentage point, which implies average annual productivity growth is 
reduced between 6 and 14 percent. These numbers are fairly significant, as a 0.1 percent average annual 
growth rate for MFP roughly equals the average annual contribution of the capital stock to manufacturing 
growth during this period.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Because of the high import penetration in semiconductors and other high-tech products, consistently 
adjusting domestic and import prices for product improvements is important for the accuracy of industry and 
national income statistics, though difficult owing to lack of product detail, particularly for imports. Addressing this 
problem has resulted in substantial revisions to the national accounts statistics in the past (Grimm 1998).  
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If we exclude the contribution of the computer and electronic products industry, correcting for 
offshoring results in larger percentage adjustments to MFP, which falls from 0.67 percent in column (2) 
to between 0.52 percent (column 3) and 0.58 percent (column 4); in other words, the reduction in MFP 
widens to as much as 22 percent. The results for the case study scenarios shown in columns (5) and (6) 
are quite consistent with our results based on IPP microdata. 
What about the likely range of bias to value added? Recall that value added nets out intermediate 
inputs from an industry’s shipments, and therefore represents the additional product produced in an 
industry.21 If, as suggested by Figure 7, the actual amount of intermediate materials used by U.S. 
manufacturers has been larger than what is contained in the official statistics, then value added has been 
overstated as well. This implies that a larger share of the sector’s production has simply been final 
assembly, and relatively less of domestic manufacturing shipments are contributing value to the overall 
economy.  
The BEA derives indexes for industry-level value added using the double-deflation method in 
which real value added is computed as the difference between real gross output and real intermediate 
inputs. We replicate this double-deflation procedure using our adjusted measures of real purchased 
materials. We therefore derive the implied value of real value added –associated with published measures 
of gross output, energy, and services and our adjusted measures of purchased materials inputs. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents alternative estimates for value added based on our different 
assumptions on the import discount. Of note, the unadjusted average growth rate in value added for all 
manufacturing is about 3 percent, while the annual growth rate for manufacturing, excluding the computer 
sector, is less than one-third of this size—about 0.9 percent. The annual growth rate for the computer 
industry exceeds 20 percent. As shown in columns (3) through (6), our simulations indicate that value-
added growth for all manufacturing was overstated by 0.2–0.5 percentage point, or about 7–18 percent of 
the growth. Excluding computers, real value-added growth for manufacturing is biased by 0.2–0.4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Gross domestic product can therefore be derived as the sum of value added across all sectors of the 
economy. 
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percentage point, which accounts for 21–49 percent of the growth.!22 The annual growth rate of real 
value added for manufacturing excluding computers falls under a half percent per year in some of our 
adjusted estimates, while that for nondurable goods turns negative for all of our adjusted estimates. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA AND RESEARCH 
The above analysis focuses on biases to manufacturing productivity and value added from the 
substitution of lower-cost imported for domestic materials inputs. Such biases, however, may also arise 
from the offshoring of other inputs and affect statistics for other sectors and for the aggregate economy.23
In the 2000s, sizable import penetration by developing countries occurred in computers and machinery 
products, which largely are treated as capital inputs in the industry accounts. Price drops accompanying 
the substitution of imported for domestic capital equipment would not be captured in capital price 
deflators, possibly leading to an understatement of the growth of capital services and an overstatement of 
growth in MFP and real value added.  
The same problem arises from services offshoring. Collecting accurate price information on 
services trade is complicated by the fact that the level of detail in services sector data is quite limited 
(Jensen 2009, Norwood et al. 2006,Sturgeon et al. 2006, ), and that the BLS international prices program 
does not cover business services imports and exports. If services offshoring were to expand rapidly in the 
near future, as some predict, the absence of accurate price deflators could impart significant biases in 
official statistics.  
More generally, the Shumpetarian dynamic by which low-cost producers enter and capture 
market share from incumbents is an important mechanism by which prices change, but is a dynamic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 In addition to the “switchers” estimates, we attempted to adjust for unobserved differences within 
detailed product codes using econometric techniques. These estimates do not alter the qualitative results of our 
analysis, and imply bias adjustments to MFP and value added roughly in line with the “30/15” estimates in Table 3. 
23 Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2009) examine pricing in selected consumer goods and provide preliminary 
evidence of biases to GDP from import growth. Biases to price indexes from offshoring and their implied biases to 
GDP growth also have been covered in the business press (see Mandel 2007, 2009). 
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largely missed in price indexes. Although we have focused on the substitution of low-cost foreign for 
domestic inputs because of the recent empirical importance of offshoring, the entrance and market share 
expansion of low-cost domestic suppliers is an important aspect of firm dynamics in the United States and 
also would impart biases to price indexes.24 As mentioned above, a proposal to construct an input price 
index based on a survey of purchasers, if implemented by BLS, would address the biases to the industry 
statistics from all shifts in sourcing (Alterman 2009).25
The growth of low-cost imports has spurred numerous studies to assess their effects on the U.S. 
economy and its workers. Biases to price indexes that arise from offshoring affect the accuracy not only 
of the industry statistics, but also of analyses based on them. Because such import growth will be 
understated in real terms and, to some degree, will be manifested as false productivity gains, studies may 
underestimate the true effects of import growth.  
The pace of globalization is unlikely to abate in the near future, underscoring the need for reliable 
economic statistics to understand its effects and formulate policy responses. The biases to price indexes 
discussed in this paper are emblematic of a broader set of measurement problems that arise from the 
growth of globalization (Feenstra and Lipsey 2010, Houseman and Ryder 2010). Understanding the 
effects of globalization requires better data, including, quite critically, better price deflators. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See Foster, Haltiwager, and Syverson (2008) for evidence that entrants, on average, have higher physical 
productivity and offer lower prices than incumbent firms.  
25 The proposed index, which would not distinguish source country, would capture price changes from 
shifts in sourcing among domestic suppliers, among domestic and international suppliers, and among international 
suppliers. Although the input price index would address biases in the industry statistics, it would not address biases 
in published statistics on GDP growth, which are based on expenditure, not industry value-added, data.   
20 
References 
Alterman, William. 2009. “Producing an Input Price Index.” Paper prepared for the conference 
“Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of Globalization,” held in Washington, DC, 
November, 6–7 
Bergsten, C. Fred. 2010. “Beijing Is Key to Creating More U.S. Jobs.” Foreignpolicy.com. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/14/china_the_job_killer?print=yes&hidecomment
s=yes&page=full (accessed June 10, 2010).
Brown, Clair, and Greg Linden. 2005. “Offshoring in the Semiconductor Industry: A Historical 
Perspective.” In Brookings Trade Forum: 2005: Offshoring White-Collar Work, Lael Brainard 
and Susan M. Collins, eds. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 279–333. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1997. “International Price Indexes.” BLS Handbook of Methods, 154–159. 
Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2008. “Producer Prices.” BLS Handbook of Methods, 1–12. Washington, DC.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009. “International Comparisons of Manufacturing Productivity and Unit 
Labor Cost Trends, 2008.” News Release. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/prod4.pdf
Byrne, David, Brian Kovak, and Ryan Michaels. 2010. “Offshoring and Price Measurement in the 
Semiconductor Industry.” Paper prepared for the conference “Measurement Issues Arising from 
the Growth of Globalization,” held in Washington, DC, November, 6–7, 2009. 
Cavallo, Michele, and Anthony Landry. 2010. “The Quantitative Role of Capital Goods Imports in U.S. 
Growth.” American Economic Review 100(2): 78–82. 
Cline, William R., and John Williamson. 2010. “Notes on Equilibrium Exchange Rates: January 2010.” 
Peterson Institute for International Economics Number PB10-2. Washington, DC: Peterson 
Institute for International Economics. 
Corrado, Carol, and Joe Mattey. 1997. “Capacity Utilization.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(1): 
151–167. 
21 
Diewert, W. Erwin. 1998. “Index Number Issues in the Consumer Price Index.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 12(1): 47–58. 
Diewert, W. Erwin, and Alice Nakamura. 2010. “Bias in the Import Price Index Due to Outsourcing: Can 
It be Measured?” Paper prepared for the conference “Measurement Issues Arising from the 
Growth of Globalization,” held in Washington, DC, November, 6–7, 2009. 
Economist. 2005. “Finance and Economics—Manufacturing Employment—Industrial 
Metamorphosis.” 377(8446): 69.  
Eldridge, Lucy P., and Michael J. Harper. 2009. “Effects of Imported Intermediate Inputs on 
Productivity.” Paper prepared for the conference “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth 
of Globalization,” held in Washington, DC, November, 6–7. 
Engardio, Pete, and Dexter Roberts. 2004. “The China Price.” Business Week, December 6. 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_49/b3911401.htm (accessed June 9, 2010). 
Executive Office of the President of the United States. 2009. “A Framework for Revitalizing American 
Manufacturing.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Feenstra, Robert, and Robert Lipsey. 2010. Report on the State of Available Data for the Study of 
International Trade and Investment. Report prepared for the Committee on Economics Statistics 
of the American Economic Association.  
Foster, Lucia, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson. 2008. “Reallocation, Firm Turnover and Efficiency: 
Selection on Productivity or Profitability?” American Economic Review 98(1): 394–425. 
Grimm, Bruce T. 1998. “Price Indexes for Selected Semiconductors.” Survey of Current Business 78(2): 
8–24. 
Hausman, Jerry. 2003. “Sources of Bias and Solutions to Bias in the Consumer Price Index.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 17(1): 23–44. 
Helper, Susan. 2008. “Renewing U.S. Manufacturing: Promoting a High-Road Strategy.” EPI Briefing 
Paper 212. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
22 
Houseman, Susan, Christopher Kurz, Paul Lengermann, and Benjamin Mandel. 2010. “Offshoring Bias: 
The Effect of Import Price Mismeasurement on Manufacturing Productivity and Value Added 
Growth.” Mimeo. 
Houseman, Susan, and Kenneth Ryder. 2010. Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of 
Globalization. Report prepared for the U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs, Washington, DC 
Hulten, Charles R. 2009. “Growth Accounting.” NBER Working Paper No. 15341. Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Jensen, J. Bradford. 2009. “Measuring the Impact of Trade in Services: Prospects and Challenges.” Paper 
prepared for the conference “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of Globalization,” 
held in Washington, DC, November, 6–7. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., Frank M. Gollop, and Barbara M. Fraumeni. 1987. Productivity and U.S. Economic 
Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Jorgenson, Dale W., Mun S. Ho, and Kevin J. Stiroh. 2008. “A Retrospective Look at the U.S. 
Productivity Growth Resurgence.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(1): 3–24. 
Kinsman, Michael. 2004. “Exporting Work: Outsourcing That Once Sent Low-Skill Jobs to Mexico Is 
Now Sending Some of San Diego’s High-Skilled, High-Wage Jobs to India, China and 
Elsewhere.” San Diego Tribune, April 4. 
http://64.9.213.241/files/old/news/articles/san_diego_tribune_4_4_04.pdf (accessed June 9, 
2010). 
Klier, Thomas H., and James M. Rubenstein. 2009. “Imports of Intermediate Parts in the Auto Industry—
A Case Study.” Paper prepared for the conference “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth 
of Globalization,” held in Washington, DC, November 6–7. 
Leonard, Jeremy A. 2008. “The Tide is Turning: An Update on Structural Cost Pressures Facing U.S. 
Manufacturers.” Published jointly by the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI and The Manufacturing 
Institute. http://institute.nam.org/view/2001005065073451188/info (accessed June 10, 2010). 
23 
Linden, Greg, Jason Dedrick, and Kenneth L. Kraemer. 2009. “What the iPod Tells Us.” 
http://delong.typepad.com/egregious_moderation/2009/12/greg-linden-jason-dedrick-and-
kenneth-l-kraemer-what-the-ipod-tells-us.html (accessed June 10, 2010).
Mandel, Michael. 2007. “The Real Costs of Offshoring.” Business Week, June 18. 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_25/b4039001.htm (accessed June 9, 2010). 
———. 2009. “Growth: Why the Stats Are Misleading.” Business Week, June 3. 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_24/b4135000594984.htm (accessed June 9, 
2010). 
Mandel, Benjamin R. 2010. “Heterogeneous Firms and Import Quality: Evidence from Transaction-Level 
Prices.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion 
Paper No. 991. Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
McKinsey & Company. 2006. “China and India as Global Supply Points: A Business Opportunity!” 
Consensor Results. Presentation Pudong Shangri-La Hotel, Shanghai, May 22–24. !
Murray, Sara. 2009 “U.S. Manufacturing Productivity Jumps.” Wall Street Journal, October 23, A:2.  
Nakamura, Emi, and Jón Steinsson. 2009. “Lost in Transit: Product Replacement Bias and Pricing to 
Market.” New York: Columbia University http://www.columbia.edu/~en2198/papers/ippsubs.pdf
(accessed June 10, 2010). 
New America Foundation. 2010. “America Needs a Manufacturing Strategy.” (February 3). 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/america_needs_a_manufacturing_ strategy.
Norwood, Janet L., Carol Carson, Manuel Deese, Norman J. Johnson, Franklin S. Reeder, and John E. 
Rolph. 2006. Offshoring: How Big Is It? Report of the Panel of the National Academy of Public 
Administration for the U.S. Congress and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Academy 
of Public Administration, Washington, DC.  
Oliner, Stephen D., and Daniel E. Sichel. 2000. “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is 
Information Technology the Story?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(4): 3–22. 
24 
Oliner, Stephen D., Daniel E. Sichel, and Kevin J. Stiroh. 2007. “Explaining a Productive Decade.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 81–137. 
Pisano, Gary P., and Willy C. Shih. 2009. “Restoring American Competitiveness.” Harvard Business 
Review July-August: 114–125. 
Pollin, Robert, and Dean Baker. 2010. “Reindustrializing America: A Proposal for Reviving U.S. 
Manufacturing and Creating Millions of Good Jobs.” New Labor Forum 19(2): 17–34. 
Reich, Robert B. 2009. “Made in America: Manufacturing Jobs are Never Coming Back.” Forbes.com: 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/28/robert-reich-manufacturing-business-economy.html (accessed 
June 10, 2010)
Reinsdorf, Marshall. 1993. “The Effect of Outlet Price Differentials in the U.S. Consumer Price Index.” 
In Price Measurements and Their Use, Murray F. Foss, Marylin E. Manser, and Allan H. Young, 
eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 227–254. 
Reinsdorf, Marshall, and Robert Yuskavage. 2009. “Are There Unmeasured Declines in Prices of 
Imported Final Consumption Goods?” “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of 
Globalization,” held in Washington, DC, November, 6–7. 
Sturgeon, Timothy J., Frank Levy, Clair Brown, J. Bradford Jensen, and David Weil. 2006. “Why We 
Can’t Measure the Economic Effects of Services Offshoring: The Data Gaps and How to Fill 
Them.” Services Offshoring Working Group Final Report. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Industrial Performance Center. 
http://web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/pdf/IPC_Offshoring_Report.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010). 
Surdna Foundation. 2010. “Revitalizing America’s Manufacturing Sector.” Surdna.org. 
http://www.surdna.org/what-we-fund/sustainable-environments/sustainable-environments-whats-
new/203-revitalizing-americas-manufacturing-sector-summary-of-surdna-roundtable.html.
Syverson, Chad. 2010. “What Determines Productivity?” NBER Working Paper No. 15712. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
25 
Wasshausen, David B., and Brent R. Moulton. 2006. “The Role of Hedonic Methods in Measuring Real 
GDP in the United States. Prepared for the 31st Committee on Statistical Information in the 
Economic and Social Sphere (CEIES) seminar “Are We Measuring Productivity Correctly?” held 
in Rome, October 12–13. 
Yuskavage, Robert E., Erich H. Strassner, and Gabriel W. Medeiros. 2008. “Outsourcing and Imported 
Services in BEA’s Industry Accounts.” In International Flows of Invisibles: Trade in Services 
and Intangibles in the Era of Globalization, Marshall Reinsdorf, and Matthew Slaughter, eds. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 247–288. 
26 
Figure 1: The Import Share of Material Inputs Used by U.S. Manufactures  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Im
p
o
rt
!S
h
a
re
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Advanced
Intermediate
Developing
!
NOTE: Imported intermediates are decomposed into their source country of origin and plotted as their portion of 
the share of imported intermediate in total materials use by the manufacturing sector.  
SOURCE: BEA Annual Industry Accounts and Import Microdata
!
Figure 2: Manufacturing Employment, 1960-2009 
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Figure 3: Manufacturing: Labor Productivity and Employment Relative to Total 
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Figure 5: Baseline Input Price Indexes for the Manufacturing Sector      
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Figure 6 
!
NOTE: The import price discount for each NAICS category averages across many underlying detailed 
product groups classified according to the U.S. Harmonized System (HS 10-digit) for the months September 
1993–May 2007. Within an HS group, the developing (or advanced) country discount is the average of 
individual item prices exported from developing (or advanced) countries relative to a geometric mean of 
advanced country transaction prices.  
SOURCE: BLS
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Figure 7: Materials Cost Inflation for U.S. Manufacturing Industries  
!
!
!
!
NOTE: The figure contrasts the materials cost inflation as published by the BEA with an adjusted measure derived from IPP 
micro data and Census foreign trade shares. For each manufacturing industry, and manufacturing as a whole, cost measures are 
computed as the cumulative percent change between the published and hypothetical index values in 2007 and 1997. A cost 
inflation of 0.2, for example, represents a 20 percent increase in prices over the decade. Two industries, petroleum products, 
and computer and electronic components, were included in the overall manufacturing number but excluded from the charts. 
Petroleum products had cumulative input cost inflation of 137 percent and bias-corrected inflation of 134 percent. Computer 
and peripherals had input costs decline by 35 percent, 51 percent adjusted.  
SOURCE: BEA, BLS, and Census.
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